TOWARD AN IMAGINATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A PROPOSAL FOR MINNOWBROOK IV

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ABSTRACT
This study advances Imaginative Public Administration (IPA) as a Minnowbrook IV-level paradigm that reconfigures governance by treating imagination as an epistemology, AI as a cognitive partner, symbolic meaning as the core of legitimacy, and strategic capital allocation as the foundation of sovereign resilience. Based on document analysis, the study positions IPA as a substantive departure from Minnowbrook I-III, portraying the state as a cognitive-symbolic ecosystem structured around three Wings and two strategic Extensions. The IPA Policy Cycle supplants traditional linear models with an imagination-driven process strengthened by power-market, capital-market, and risk-market feedback loops. Although this enhances the state's anticipatory capacity, it simultaneously introduces dual-use dangers, including managerial overreach and the fabrication of engineered legitimacy. The study ultimately finds that IPA forms a coherent paradigm for governing contemporary hybrid systems composed of states, markets, non-state forces, and AI infrastructures.
Keywords: Imaginative Public Administration (IPA), Minnowbrook IV, Cognitive-Symbolic Ecosystem, AI governance, Kakistoscryptocracy, Governmental Power Market-ing, Strategic Capital Allocation, Hybrid Governance Systems

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INTRODUCTION

The twenty-first century places Public Administration in a new configuration of power where AI-driven cognition, fragmented sovereignty, and platform-based non-state actors govern through data, algorithms, and predictive models rather than traditional legal-bureaucratic channels. Traditional paradigms - New Public Administration (NPA), New Public Management (NPM), and Digital Public Administration (DGA) - were designed for earlier waves of turbulence and therefore only partly illuminate this condition. NPA, as crystallized in Toward a New Public Administration, redefined administration as a normative, value-laden enterprise oriented to social equity and democratic responsiveness, not a neutral technical apparatus. NPM arose from market-based reforms, privatization, and contractual governance, and by Minnowbrook III it was already evident that the pendulum had swung too far toward dependence on private and nonprofit providers, requiring the state to reassert its place in governance. DGA is the PA I coined, a PA built on the IT revolution - email, the Internet, and global communication infrastructures - but which still tends to treat technology as an enabling tool for efficiency and connectivity, not yet as an autonomous locus of algorithmic power. At the same time, Minnowbrook I, II, and III share a strong continuity with state-based public administration by taking government and self-governance within constitutional orders as their central reference points. Minnowbrook I sought to redefine the field beyond narrow efficiency while still anchoring it in public institutions; Minnowbrook II framed government and self-governance as twin urgent responsibilities; and Minnowbrook III internationalized and pluralized this focus through attention to future public organizations, global paradigms, collaborative governance, deliberative democracy, and leadership education. Together, the Minnowbrook tradition remains fundamentally state-based, and today's fusion of AI cognition, borderless data flows, and non-state platform power dislocates - but does not erase - this legacy, demanding new frameworks that still take the state seriously while explaining governance in hybrid constellations of states, markets, non-state actors, net states, and intelligent machines (particularly thanks to Marini, 1971; Frederickson, 1989, 1996; Guy, 1989; Holzer, 1989; Bowornwathana, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Gohwong, 2023).

Public administration faces four irreversible realities: AI exceeding regulatory capacity; net states and platform empires bypassing Westphalian sovereignty; a transition from bureaucratic hierarchies to cognitive-symbolic ecosystems; and the need for governments to be smart investors, not just regulators, to withstand technological shocks. In response, Imaginative Public Administration (IPA) reconceptualizes governance by treating imagination as an epistemology, AI as a cognitive partner, meaning as the foundation of legitimacy, and capital allocation as the core mechanism of state resilience. Strengthened by three additional forces - kakistoscryptocracy, which accelerates governance failure through algorithmic amplification; governmental power market-ing, which positions the state as a competitor within the marketplace of power; and Buffett-style capital allocation, which reframes strategic statecraft as long-term value investing - IPA emerges as a paradigm commensurate with a Minnowbrook IV moment (particularly thanks to Enriquez, 2001; Pecaut & Wrenn, 2017; Tulchinsky, 2018; Gohwong, 2023, 2024, 2026).

Yet this conceptual leap was not always possible. Although Bowornwathana's Minnowbrook-oriented proposal offered an important intellectual contribution to Thai Public Administration, it was inevitably constrained by the technological conditions of its era. His framework treated AI merely as an assistive tool, not as an autonomous cognitive actor capable of reshaping governance, legitimacy, or state capacity. This is unsurprising, given that the work was formulated during the AI Winter phases (1974-1980 and 1987-1993). These periods were defined by technical immaturity: unreliable expert systems, restricted computing power, and funding reductions. Consequently, governments at that time viewed the technology as administratively peripheral, incapable of generalization, adaptive learning, or supporting

critical decision infrastructures. Consequently, earlier PA scholarship, including Bowornwathana's, could not conceptualize AI as a sovereign challenger, epistemic partner, or meaning-producing institution - roles that only emerged after deep-learning breakthroughs in 2012, the rise of large-scale foundation models after 2018, and multimodal generative AI after 2022. IPA therefore advances far beyond the ontological limits of its predecessors by treating AI as a structural force, not merely an instrument (particularly thanks to Bowornwathana, 2010; Banafa, 2022; Jamison, 2023).

It is precisely at this historical inflection point that Imaginative Public Administration (IPA) departs from all previous Minnowbrook traditions. Unlike any existing framework in the Public Administration canon, IPA constitutes an entirely original theoretical contribution - one that has not appeared in any of the paradigm-setting traditions from Minnowbrook I through Minnowbrook III. **No prior scholarship has treated imagination as an epistemology, AI as a cognitive partner, symbolic meaning as the core of legitimacy, or capital allocation as a mechanism of state resilience.** IPA, therefore, represents a paradigmatic innovation unprecedented in both classical and contemporary PA literature. Therefore, t**his study explores IPA through three critical components: 1) its framework, which reconceptualizes the state as a cognitive-symbolic ecosystem operating within a power marketplace; 2) its policy cycle, which replaces linear problem-solving with an imagination-driven, AI-augmented sequence of envisioning, narrativizing, co-creating, institutionalizing, and adaptive re-imagination; and 3) its contribution to Minnowbrook IV as a genuinely new paradigm - one that integrates AI, kakistoscryptocracy, governmental power market-ing, and Buffett-style strategic capital allocation into a coherent theory of governance for the twenty-first century.**

LITERATURE REVIEWS

Imaginative Public Administration

Imaginative Public Administration (IPA) derived its epistemological foundation from Albert Einstein's 1931 assertion that "imagination is more important than knowledge," a principle that recognized imagination as the deeper structure through which new realities were conceived before they became knowable. Public administration entered the twenty-first century facing a world where knowledge-once the stable anchor of bureaucratic governance-could no longer keep pace with the speed of computational transformation, AI prediction, and narrative manipulation. IPA extended Einstein's insight into a formal theory of governance by arguing that imagination, not accumulated administrative expertise, was the primary resource for navigating multi-sovereign environments shaped by AI systems, net states, and power markets. In this sense, imagination became an operational epistemology: a state's ability to envision, narrativize, and construct meaning determined its survival in an age where legitimacy, authority, and public value emerged from symbolic and cognitive processes rather than administrative routines.

The rise of IPA did not imply, however, that the state lacked algorithmic foundations previously. As Gohwong's 2015 study of AI application in Public Administration demonstrated, modern bureaucracies had always been algorithmic in structure: forms, workflows, civil-service procedures, budgeting rules, procurement regulations, and hierarchical decision trees all functioned as deterministic algorithms long before machine learning existed. These "proto-algorithmic states" operated through rigid rule-based systems that processed information in predictable, sequential, and non-learning formats-matching classical information theory (Cover & Thomas) and cognitive models of linguistic processing (Harley) that conceptualized institutions as fixed encoding systems rather than adaptive intelligences. This explained why earlier PA paradigms, including Bowornwathana's Minnowbrook contributions, treated AI merely as a tool rather than a cognitive actor: they were

developed during the two AI Winter periods (1974-1980; 1987-1993) when computational systems were unreliable, funding collapsed, and governments viewed AI as technically immature, administratively peripheral, and epistemically incapable of influencing governance. Coming out of the AI Winters, the swift, sequential advancements-deep learning (after 2012), foundation models (after 2018), and multimodal LLMs (after 2022)-not only reshaped historical beliefs but also brought about significant ethical issues and a vital dual-use aspect to algorithmic capabilities, necessitating a fresh regulatory perspective. Algorithms transcended rule execution to actively generate narratives, simulate futures, and shape identities. Their newfound capacity to mediate attention meant they began to compete directly with state structures for both legitimacy and coercive power. IPA therefore integrated three complementary insights: 1) Einstein's imagination-as-epistemology, which enabled states to govern possibilities rather than inventories; 2) the recognition that public administration had always been algorithmic but lacked adaptive cognitive capacity; and 3) the contemporary reality that LLMs functioned as cognitive partners capable of co-producing policy, meaning, and power. By fusing these strands with kakistoscryptocracy, governmental power marketing, and Buffett-style capital allocation, IPA redefined the state as a cognitive-symbolic ecosystem operating inside contested algorithmic and economic markets. It offered the first paradigm capable of governing-not what the state already knew-but what it needed to imagine into existence to survive in the AI-driven world (particularly thanks to Einstein, 1931; Harley, 2001; Peters, 2001; Cover & Thomas, 2006; Gohwong, 2015, 2023; State Chancellery of the Republic of Latvia, 2015; Tulchinsky, 2018; Vesnic-Alujevic et al., 2019; Banafa, 2022; Jamison, 2023; Ministry of Public Administration, 2023).

Governmental power market-ing in the vu-chaos world

Governmental Power Market-ing (GPM) was essentially a guide for state-driven influence rather than a conventional governance theory, defining the state as a self-serving producer of power. The framework's core justification for the strategic manufacturing of legitimacy and mass behavior management rested on the exigencies of VU-CHAOS. To compete against "net states," GPM relied on advanced, ethically dubious mechanisms-notably spin doctors, symbolic engineering, and narrative orchestration. This approach reduced governance to a competitive power marketplace, where the state was positioned as a cognitive-symbolic brand whose primary objective became the continuous control of perception and securing of loyalty, thus equating effective governance with aggressive market manipulation. Throughout its three parts, GPM redefined governance as the market-ing of power, framing the state as a cognitive-symbolic brand that must consistently cultivate loyalty, manage perception, and maintain authority in a volatile, information-overloaded environment (Jermsittiparsert et al., 2023).

Kakistoscryptocracy

Kakistoscryptocracy, coined by Gohwong, described a severe erosion of state sovereignty marked by the unprecedented freedom of non-state actors. This included non-government-based cryptocurrency (NGC) users, pirate organizations, cybercriminals, and net states operating across both physical and virtual domains. Exploiting metaverses, decentralized NGCs, and underground networks, these non-state actors established anarchic zones where transactions and illegal activities occurred completely beyond state oversight, effectively enabling them to establish their own operational rules. Their methodology mirrored Inagaki's "strategy of weeds," characterized by decentralization, strategic avoidance of state confrontation, and heavy reliance on deep/dark web infrastructure. In an effort to address this crisis, the state initiated two distinct countermeasures: the Tech Ambassador for diplomatic engagement with legitimate digital entities, and the Corsair mechanism, which utilized ethical hackers to actively disrupt illegal online networks (Gohwong, 2023).

Buffett-style capital allocation

Buffett-style capital allocation provided IPA with its financial logic by requiring governments in a kakistoscryptocratic world to deploy resources with the same discipline that defined Berkshire Hathaway-emphasizing long-term orientation, conviction-based investment, high-moat assets, anti-fragile strategy, opportunity-cost awareness, and the compounding of public value. Within this framework, public budgeting evolved into the Strategic State Capital Allocation Model (SSCAM), translating private-sector investment principles into statecraft: reinvesting earnings became investment in education, talent, and AI R&D; mergers and acquisitions became national AI clouds and bio-hubs; deleveraging became fiscal sustainability; dividends became welfare transfers; and buybacks became SOE restructuring and strategic land banking. Porter's theory strengthened this logic by identifying the national domains where competitive moats needed to be constructed, thereby giving Buffett's allocation principles a strategic map for where disciplined, long-term public investment would yield the greatest sovereign returns. Buffett's framework then operationalized Porter's insights by explaining how states should allocate resources to reinforce these high-moat domains sustainably. By linking Porter's "where to invest" with Buffett's "how to invest," IPA repositioned the imaginative state as a disciplined, rational, long-horizon engine of capital allocation-treating public expenditure not as routine spending but as a portfolio of strategic bets designed to build sovereign resilience, compound public value, and secure long-term national advantage (particularly thanks to Pecaut & Wrenn, 2017; Porter, 1990/1998).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodologically, this study was based on rigorous document analysis, synthesizing evidence drawn from a broad array of authoritative sources.

RESEARCH RESULTS

IPA framework

Under IPA, the state was redefined as a cognitive-symbolic actor, conceptualized as an aircraft structure shown in Figure 1, whose core agency lay in its ability to strategically co-create and simulate futures in formal partnership with AI and its citizenry. This framework provided governments with the essential strategic maneuverability needed to effectively navigate an environment marked by rapid AI advancement, fierce net-state rivalry, and significant shifts in cognitive-symbolic influence. It was built around three "Wings" because these represented the three irreducible functions a modern state had to master: 1) the Cognitive Wing for enabling thinking and anticipation through AI-augmented reasoning; 2) the Symbolic Wing for generating meaning, legitimacy, and narrative coherence; and 3) the Co-Creative Wing for embedding citizens directly into the state's cognitive loop through deliberative AI. These were called "Wings" because they were understood as capabilities that enabled the state to act, like the aerodynamic surfaces of an aircraft—distinct but interdependent, each generating a different form of lift. In contrast, the two "Extensions" were not considered everyday functions but defensive and strategic architectures that sat on top of the three Wings: Extension A protected the state from kakistoscryptocratic decay and algorithmic corruption, while Extension B equipped the state to allocate capital like a long-term investor to survive technological shocks. They were not labeled as "Wings" because they did not generate cognitive or symbolic lift; instead, they provided structural reinforcement and future-proofing. Together, the 3 Wings and 2 Extensions formed an integrated Minnowbrook IV-level framework capable of governing complexity, resisting worst-actor dynamics, and compounding national resilience over decades (particularly thanks to Banafa, 2024; Bowornwathana, 2010; Cover & Thomas, 2006; Einstein, 1931; Frederickson, 1989, 1996; Gohwong, 2015, 2023, 2025, 2026; Guy, 1989; Harley, 2001; Holzer, 1989; Jamison, 2023;

Jermsittiparsert et al., 2023; Kim, O'Leary, Van Slyke, Frederickson & Lambright, 2010; Marini, 1971; Ministry of Public Administration, 2023; Pecaut & Wrenn, 2017; Peters, 2001; Porter, 1990; State Chancellery of Latvia, 2015; Tulchinsky, 2018; Vesnic-Alujevic, Stoermer, Rudkin, Scapolo & Kimbell, 2019).



Figure 1 The IPA Paradigm represented as an aircraft structure, reconceiving the State as a Cognitive-Symbolic Organism.
Note. The figure was produced with AI to support conceptual explanation.

As depicted in Figure 1, each component of the IPA framework is elaborated below.
Initially, **the Cognitive Wing** reinterpreted the state as a cognitive entity whose intelligence emerged from merging AI-based reasoning, prompt understanding, foresight modeling, and synthetic scenario generation into essential bureaucratic operations. AI-assisted policy reasoning enabled ministries to process vast, real-time datasets-mobility flows, social signals, satellite images-and generate draft policies that human officials refined, turning policy design into a continuous cognition loop. Prompt literacy became the new bureaucratic competence: civil servants had to know how to instruct AI models, control reasoning depth, and detect hallucinations, similar to how legal drafting once defined administrative professionalism. Foresight simulation leveraged agent-based modeling and reinforcement learning to test policy interventions before implementation-for example, simulating how a new excise tax affected low-income households' mobility behavior across provinces. Synthetic scenario generation allowed states to stress-test existential risks-cyber-attacks, biothreats, energy crises-under thousands of modeled futures in minutes. Together, the Cognitive Wing operationalized a bureaucracy that anticipated rather than reacted, fulfilling Minnowbrook's call for normatively grounded yet technologically enabled public judgment.
Next, **the Symbolic Wing** treated meaning-not rules-as the core currency of legitimacy in a cognitive-symbolic era where citizens interpreted governance through narratives, signals, and digital symbolism. Symbolic MIS transformed management information systems from statistical dashboards into cultural interfaces that visualized values, ethical commitments, and policy narratives; for example, a climate-action dashboard that displayed the nation's carbon reduction as a collective achievement, not merely a technocratic KPI. Moreover, Khon symbolism provides the Thai state with a culturally grounded mental model for understanding all types of non-state actors by mapping their behaviors onto familiar archetypes in the Ramakien narrative. Through figures such as Thotsakan, representing manipulation, chaos, and multi-headed agendas, the state can interpret disruptive groups, illicit networks, or actors who exploit system vulnerabilities; through Hanuman, symbolizing agility, innovation, and boundary-crossing intelligence, officials can better understand tech firms and other "net-state" entities that reshape governance through speed and creativity; and through Sita and supporting characters, the state can interpret the moral influence, vulnerability, and collective pressure exerted by citizens, NGOs, and smaller community groups. Collectively, these symbolic roles turned Khon into a type of Symbolic MIS, enabling public officials to interpret motives, foresee tactics, and react to non-state entities with culturally meaningful and strategically flexible

methods. Narrative governance portrayed the state as a conductor of collective narratives-clarifying the rationale behind specific policies, their ultimate objectives, and the role citizens played in them-thereby influencing public expectations and minimizing opposition. Algorithmic transparency evolved into a type of symbolic authority: governments demonstrated integrity and reduced concerns about manipulation by disclosing model logic, audit trails, and fairness metrics. Meaning-making legitimacy recognized that public trust arose not from conventional authority but from citizens' views of the state's justifications as consistent, moral, and aligned with their values. Consequently, this Wing equipped governments with the crucial symbolic intelligence necessary to survive an era where fleeting TikTok micro-narratives possessed the power to dismantle billion-baht public programs overnight.

Later, **the Co-Creative Wing** redefined democracy as collaborative governance, with citizens and the state collectively influencing policy through AI-assisted deliberation. This involved citizen co-prompting, which allowed participants to generate solutions, critique trade-offs, and simulate policy consequences by interacting with shared AI platforms, moving public hearings beyond symbolic rituals to knowledge-rich dialogues. Deliberative AI greatly aided these processes by condensing arguments, pinpointing agreement, charting value disputes, and emphasizing unarticulated assumptions, promoting unparalleled levels of deliberation in large-scale democracies. Foresight democracy let citizens explore scenarios (e.g., banning Bangkok motorcycles or moving defense funds to healthcare), basing decisions on data instead of emotions. The Wing transformed governance from top-down administration to collaborative future-building, strengthening democracy through participatory design.

After that, the Extension A: Anti-Kakistoscryptocracy Architecture centralized considerable power under the rationale of preventing algorithmic corruption. Although its objective was to halt a "kakistoscryptocracy," the architecture itself created significant potential for abuse. The ethical AI infrastructure gave the state the authority to operationalize its own definition of fairness across critical systems, including welfare algorithms. The most consequential element was the manipulation and corruption shield, which used anomaly detection and cryptographic logs to identify irregular patterns. This design made it highly attractive for authoritarian adaptation. It could also be redeployed in far more harmful ways-well beyond detecting bid-rigging-to monitor, classify, and suppress political dissent by reframing legitimate civic expression as "coordinated bot influence." Ultimately, the digital brain was shielded from external capture only to become susceptible to internal domination by its own creators.

Lastly, **the Extension B: Strategic Capital Allocation Architecture** treated the state as a long-horizon investor whose durability depended on its ability to allocate capital strategically rather than merely regulate it. Opportunity-cost screening required governments to assess not only the value of funded programs but also the cost of foregone alternatives; for example, AI education was prioritized over short-term subsidy schemes because it produced intergenerational returns. Public investments in digital systems, skills training, and research were structured as long-term assets, yielding compounding societal returns over decades. High-moat public assets consisted of national data repositories, digital identity systems, sovereign AI models, and long-cycle scientific programs that other states could not easily replicate. Risk-adjusted GROI evaluated policies on their resilience benefits rather than just their economic returns. A cybersecurity upgrade, for example, was valued for its significant reduction in systemic risk, even if it didn't directly boost GDP. Strategic bets under uncertainty obligated the state to invest in frontier domains such as quantum communications, AI safety, and green hydrogen despite incomplete information, mirroring a Buffett-style portfolio that balanced risk against asymmetric upside. In sum, the architecture allowed the state to act as a disciplined investor able to withstand technological turbulence.

IPA's policy cycle

The IPA Policy Cycle reframed policymaking as an Imagination Cycle. It began with **Envisioning** alternative futures through AI-enabled foresight, then **Narrativizing** them into culturally aligned stories. **Co-Creating** integrated citizen input and multisector collaboration, after which **Institutionalizing** embedded these visions into rules, structures, and capital decisions. **Re-Imaginative Feedback** closed the loop by reassessing outcomes and renewing the state's imaginative horizon. The model worked only when reinforced by power-market feedback from GPM, capital-market discipline from Buffett-style allocation, and risk-market detection from Anti-Kakistoscryptocracy Architecture. These systems ensured that state imagination was both innovative and strategically grounded. Taken together, the imagination-driven cycle worked only when supported by three meta-feedback systems. GPM provided power-market feedback by tracking legitimacy, influence, and narrative dynamics. Buffett-style allocation provided capital discipline by assessing opportunity cost and long-term value. The Anti-Kakistoscryptocracy Architecture supplied risk feedback by detecting corruption and destabilizing actors. These systems worked together to ensure the IPA Policy Cycle was both imaginative and strategically grounded (particularly thanks to Pecaut & Wrenn, 2017; Weimer & Vining, 2017; Steif, 2022; Gohwong, 2023; Jermsittiparsert et al., 2023).

IPA's contribution to Minnowbrook IV

IPA's contribution to Minnowbrook IV lay in its ability to redefine the foundations of Public Administration by introducing five paradigm-shifting advances that moved beyond the intellectual horizons of NPA, NPM, and DPA. First, it established a new epistemology of imagination, positioning imaginative foresight, AI-assisted scenario generation, and narrative construction as core methods of knowing and governing. Second, it redefined the state's legitimacy as emerging from shared narratives and citizen input, rather than just hierarchy. Third, it acknowledged that state power competed for influence against digital platforms, influencers, and other non-state actors. Fourth, it reframed the state as a long-term capital allocator, using Buffett-style investment to build public value and national preparedness. Fifth, it provided a logic of survival (anti-kakistos governance) to equip the state to find and stop corrupt or malicious actors amplified by AI. Together, these contributions offered a coherent blueprint for governing in a new era.

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

How the IPA Paradigm Creates a Competitive Advantage over Minnowbrook III Frameworks

IPA's new model for Minnowbrook IV is a high-tech blueprint for elite control, dressed up in progressive jargon. It hands powerful actors the exact tools they need to consolidate influence: predictive algorithms and narrative control. It starts by offering a new epistemology of imagination, a fancy term for ditching slow evidence-based models to govern by narrative construction, called propaganda. It, then, advances an ontology that is even more insidious: the state is no longer a bureaucratic hierarchy but a cognitive-symbolic ecosystem. This provides the perfect cover, as its legitimacy now comes from narrative coherence (i.e., how well the propaganda works) and AI-augmented cognition (using AI to make the propaganda more effective). Building on this, IPA introduces a new logic of power based on the idea of a "marketplace of power," where authority is contested across platforms, net-states, influencers, NGOs, algorithms, and decentralized actors, surpassing the institutional assumptions of NPA, NPM, and DPA. In addition, IPA contributes a new logic of resilience by positioning the state as a disciplined, long-horizon capital allocator capable of compounding national advantage through strategic investments in data infrastructures, AI systems, human capital, and technological moats. Finally, IPA establishes a new logic of survival through anti-kakistos

governance, equipping governments with tools to detect and counter worst-actor dynamics, algorithmic manipulation, and governance decay accelerated by digital technologies.

The significance of the IPA Policy Cycle

The IPA Policy Cycle is a powerful new governing architecture, and its high potential for misuse is exactly why it demands study. While it's framed as a forward-looking way to navigate a VU-CHAOS world-using AI-augmented deliberation and strategic capital allocation-its true power lies in its tools of control. Its reliance on real-time analytics, predictive simulation, and narrative design creates a serious risk of managerial overreach, engineered legitimacy, and the suppression of democratic debate. The very features that position the IPA Cycle as an innovation also warrant careful scrutiny. The innovative features of the IPA Cycle are the source of its core ethical dilemma. Although these tools are promoted as mechanisms for resilience and administrative enhancement, they remain fundamentally dual-use in nature. They risk quietly centralizing authority and automating participation, raising profound questions about whether their administrative benefits outweigh the danger of hollowing out democratic processes.

Propositions for Toward an IPA: A Proposal for Minnowbrook IV

I. Foundational Propositions: Ontological and Epistemological Shifts
Proposition 1 Imagination as Governing Epistemology
Proposition 2 AI as a Cognitive Partner in Governance
Proposition 3 The State as a Cognitive-Symbolic Ecosystem
II. Propositions on Sovereignty, Power, and the VU-CHAOS Condition
Proposition 4 Fragmented Sovereignty across Eight Zones
Proposition 5 Kakistoscryptocracy as Structural Erosion
Proposition 6 Governmental Power Marketing as Survival Logic
III. Propositions on State Behavior under IPA
Proposition 7 The State as Producer of Power Products
Proposition 8 Foresight and Simulation as Core Functions
Proposition 9 Hybrid Human-AI Decision Architectures
IV. Propositions on Capital Allocation and National Resilience
Proposition 10 Capital Allocation as Governance
Proposition 11 High-Moat Public Assets as Sovereign Foundations
Proposition 12 Compounding Public Value through Intergenerational Investment
V. Propositions on Institutional Design under IPA
Proposition 13 The Three-Wing Institutional Framework
Proposition 14 Anti-Kakistoscryptocracy Infrastructure
Proposition 15 Institutional Fluidity as a Survival Mechanism
VI. Propositions on IPA's Policy Cycle
Proposition 16 The Imagination Cycle as Policy Logic
Proposition 17 Algorithmic Legitimacy as Authority Source
Proposition 18 Narrative Co-Governance
VII. Propositions on Minnowbrook IV and Paradigm Formation
Proposition 20 IPA as the Paradigm for Twenty-First-Century Governance

In sum, this study has labeled IPA an innovative Minnowbrook IV-level paradigm. It is a grandiose academic term for what is, in effect, a new, untested, and potentially dangerous framework for state power. The state becomes as a cognitive-symbolic ecosystem" that uses imagination as a governing tool, AI as a cognitive partner, and strategic capital allocation for resilience. This approach, which moves beyond NPA, NPM, and DPA, is designed to handle modern threats like kakistoscryptocracy and power markets. While its 3-Wing framework and imagination cycle offer a coherent governing architecture, the study also notes its dual-use risks (surveillance, narrative control) require safeguards to protect equity and accountability.

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